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ABSTRACT 
The post-war  United States  exhibits  two rather  strong  politico-economic 
regularities.  The political  regularity  is that  the party of the President 
has always  lost votes in aid-term Congressional  elections,  relative to its 
Congressional  vote in the previous  elections;  the economic  regularity  is that 
Republican  administrations  exhibit below average  economic  growth  in  the first 
half of each term and Democratic  administrations  are  associated  with above 
average  growth  in their  first half.  In  the second halves  economic  growth  is 
similar  under  the  two  administrations.  We provide  a  rational  expectations 
model which can  explain  these  two  regularities.  In Presidential  elections 
voters have to choose  between two  polarized  candidates;  mid-term elections 
are  used to  counterbalance  the  President's  policies by  strenghtening  the 
opposition  in  Congress.  Since presidents  of  different  parties  are associated 
with different  economic policies,  our model predicts  a  (spurious)  correlation 
between  the state of the economy and elections.  The predictions  of  our model 
are in sharp  contrast  with those  of traditional  retrospective  voting  models 
in which voters simply  reward  the  incumbent  if  the  economy is  doing  well 
immediately  before the  election.  Our  empirical  results  suggest  that our 
model  performs  at least  as well and often better than  alternative  models.  In 
addition,  we  question previous  claias  that  voters  are  short  sighted  and 
naively  backward  looking. 
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There  is  increasing awareness  of  a  high  degree of  interdependence 
between  aacroeconomics  and macropolitics.'  In  the years  since  the conclusion 
of the  Second  World War  in  the  United States  there  have been some strong 
empirical  regularities  in  both the economic  and political  areas.  A political 
regularity,  the  midterm Congressional  cycle,  is well known.  As  shown  in 
Figure 1,  the party  holding  the White  House  has lost  vote share  in mid-term 
elections  both  in  the  House  and  in  the  Senate.  The  figure  shows  the 
Republican  percent  of the two party  vote.  For the intervals between  "on" and 
"off"  years  (43-50,  52-54,  ecc.),  the  curves  always  slope  downwards  with a 
Republican in  office  and upwards  with a Democratic  president.  The  same 
regularity  holds  for seats  in the House of  Representatives. 
A  macroeconomic  regularity  was first noted by Hibbs  (1977)  ,  who  showed 
that  unemployment  tended  to  fall when the Democrats  occupied  the White  House 
and rose on a Republican  watch.2  Alesina  and Sachs  (1988), Alesina (l988a) 
and Chapell-Keech  (1988) refined  this  observation,  by showing  that real CNP 
tends  to increase  at above  average rates  in the firsc two years of Democratic 
administrations  and increases  at below  average  rates  in the  first  two years 
of  Republican  administrations,  while  the  second  halves  of  the  two 
administrations  show very little  difference,  if any  (see Table  1).  Similar 
results  hold  for  unemployment.  In particular,  five of  the  seven postwar 
recessions  have  started  soon after a  Republican President  was  elected. 
Complementing  these  results  on output and unemployment,  several  researchers, 
including  Beck (1982,  l984a),  Hibbs (1987), Havrilesky (1987), Alesins end 
Sachs  (1988);  Alesina  (l988a),  Tabellini  and La Via  (1986),  Chappell  and 
Keech  (1988),  find  that monetary policy has  been  "looser",  thus  more inflationary,  when a  Democratic,  rather  than  Republican,  was  in  the  hite 
House. 
In  this  essay,  we  present  a  model  that  is  consistent  with these  two 
regularities.  Individual  agents  in both the economy  and the  electorate  are 
fully rational and  forward-looking.3  "Frictions"  in  the  economy and  the 
political process generate  the  obaerved cyclical  behavior.  The  political 
"friction"  is that  candidates  have  polarized  policy  preferences.'  Democrats, 
for example,  have a higher tolerance  for inflation  and a lower  tolerance  for 
unemployment  than do Republicans.  Because the outcome  of elections  cannot  be 
fully  anticipated,  these  policy preferences  will  lead  to  expectation 
uncertainty.  The  economic  "friction"  is that plans  and contracts  made prior 
to  elections  cat)not  be  immediately  revised  once the  winner is  known.  In 
addition,  in the model,  economic  agents  cannot  enter  into  state  contingent 
contracts  that  provide  insurance  against  electoral  risk,  Specifically,  some 
wage contracts  are  signed before  it is known  which inflation  rate  will occur 
after the  election,  since  there  is  electoral  umcertainty.  Thus,  even a 
rational public cannot predict  with certainty  the  post-election  inflation 
rate:  this  generates  a  short-run  Phillips  curve,  even  in  a  rational 
expectations  model.  However,  since  contracts  and plans  can be reformulated 
after  the  election,  the  real effects  diminish over time,  and  eventually 
disappear.  This is consistent  with the observation  that the real effects  on 
output and unemployment  are  largely  concentrated  at the  beginning of each 
administration. 
The  inability  to  anticipate  elections  also  affects  the  behavior of 
pivotal  voters,  that in our  model,  are moderate  relative  to either party. 
They  would  like  policies  in  between  those  pursued  by  Democratic and 
2 Republican  presidents.  Since  we assume  that actual  policy  is unidimensional 
and  a  function of  the  preferences  of  the  executive  and  of  the  relative 
strength  of  the  two  parties  in  tongress,  pivotal  voters can  use  their 
Congressional  votes  to moderate  the outcomes  of Presidential  elections. 
Some of this  moderating  behavior  may take  place  in Presidential  years, 
consistent  with the empirical  observation  of massive split-ticket  voting in 
the  American electorate.6  In mid-term elections,  additional  moderation  of 
the President  should  take place,  Thus,  there will be a shift  in allegiance 
of some  voters who  supported  the  President's  party during  the  Preaidential 
election.  This  shift  generates  the  midterm electoral  cycle.  Thus,  our 
model does  not  consider "coattails"  and other  explanations  of the  midterm 
tycle.  Instead,  the  purpose  of this  paper is  to present a  model  that is 
consistent with  both  this  regularity  and  the  regularity concerning  the 
macroeconomy. 
We  eliminate  other  potential  "frictions"  in order  to make the  model 
tractable.  Specifically,  we assume  that  (a)  there  are no lagged  effects  in 
the policy or the  economy,  and  (b)  voters  are  perfectly  informed  about  the 
preferences  of the  policvmakers  and about  the  state  of the  economy.  These 
assumptions  eliminates  any  incumbency  effect.  In  addition,  since 
macroeconomic  variables  depend only  upon  current  government policy  and 
agents'  expectations  of  those  policies,  there  is  no carry over from past 
policies.7  Consequently,  we can examine  each Presidential  election and  the 
ensuing  Congressional  election  as a two-period  game,  isolated  from past and 
future  history. 
Matters  are further  simplified-  -both  for  tractability  and  to highlight 
the  key  elements  of  our  model-  -by  assuming  that  the  only  source  of 
3 uncertainty  is sbout  the  distribution  of voter preferences.  Thus,  we have 
eliminated  several  important  sources  of uncertainty.  For one, preferences  of 
Presidential  candidates  are assumed known prior to an election.  For another, 
there are no exogenous  shocks  to the  economy.  As  a  result,  voters do not 
need to  learn  anything about  the  preferences  or competence  of politicians 
from observing  the  atate of the  economy.6  If learning  takes  place,  we would 
find retrospective  as well as moderating  voting.  In addition  to restricting 
the form of uncertainty,  we alao  later  make further  simplifying  aaaumptions 
for technical  reasons.  We  conjecture  that  the  qualitative  nature of  our 
results holds in more general specifications. 
The  predictions  of  our  model  contrast  sharply  with  those  of  other 
politico-economic  models.  Mordhaua  (1975)  suggested  that adminiatrations 
faced  non-rational  agents and could  therefore create  an  expansion  immediately 
before elections.  This  "electoralist"  policy would be  followed by both 
parties,  since  they both care only about  reelection.  Mctallum (1978),  (and 
several  others  after  him) provided  a substantial  body of empirical  results 
rejecting the  Mordhaua model.9  An alternative  to Nordhaus  is provided by 
Hibbs'  "partisan"  cycle.  The  Hibbs work,  however,  remains  similar  to 
Nordhaus'  in  the  assumption  of non-rational  economic  agents,  since  it  is 
based  upon  a traditional  Phillips  curve. 
On  the  political  side  the  major alternative  to  our  model  is  the 
retrospective  voting formulatiom introduced  by  Kramer  (1971).  [See  also 
Fiorina (l98l)7j.  In retrospective  models,  voters  vote for  the  incumbent 
president's  party  in good times and go  against  it in bad times.  Moreover,  as 
argued  in most  detail  by Fair (1978, 1982,  1987),  the data  would suggest that 
voters  have short memories.  Only the state of the economy  in the six months 
4 prior  to the election  has any bearing on the election  results.  In contrast, 
in the model we present  here,  voters  vote solely  to influence  the future  of 
the  economy.  Past  performance  is  irrelevant.  Since  pivotal  voters seek 
moderation and since  the  first  two  years of  administrations  will lead to 
fluctuations  in  output,  our  model  does  point to  an expected correlation 
between past economic performance  and  voting behavior.  In  "off"  years, 
voting for  the Democraca  should  be negatively  correlated  with the deviation 
from  the  longcerm  growth  rate  of the economy.  The  reason  is  that years of. 
above  average growth will occur  under  a  Democratic  president.  When  the 
electorate  votes  to  moderate  Democratic  presidents,  the  Democratic 
Congressional  vote will decline.  In  years  when the Democrats  hold the White 
House,  the  prediction  of  our  model  contrasts  sharply  with  that  of 
Kramer-Fair.  In  years  of  below average  growth-  -produced  by  Republican 
presidents--the  two models  agree  in predicting  the Democrats  will  do  well. 
Because  our model  leads  to different  predictions  than the  literature, 
Section  3  of  this  paper presents some  empirical  analysis  of  aggregate 
election  results  since  World  War  II.  We find  that  much previous  work, 
particularly  Kramer's,  fails  to  replicate  on this  period  whereas  our model 
tests  out  rather  well.  Our  results  covet  both the Senate  as well as the 
House  of  Representatives.  The empirical  section  is preceded,  in Section  2, 
by a formal  presentation  of our  theoretical  model.  Concluding  remarks  are 
contained  in  Section  4. 
2. The Model 
As in  Alesina (1987) the economy is described  by a nominal wage contract 
model,  based upon Fischer  (1977).  In  this  model wage setters  attempt  to 
5 maintain the  real  wage at  the  level  compatible  with the  natural  rate  of 
unemployment.  Labor contraots  last one period  and are signed  at the end of, 
say,  period (t-l)  for  period  t.  These  oontracta  are  non-contingent;  in 
particular,  full  indexation  is excluded.  Thus,  wage setters  set the nominal 
wage growth  equal  to expected  inflation: 
w  —  —  E(orII  t  t  I  1—1 
where  w  —  nominal  wage  growth;  or  —  rate  of  inflation;  E()  is  the 
mathematical  expectation  operator; I  is the  information  set  available  in 
period (t-l).  The  superscript  e indicates  rationally  expected variables. 
Given (I) the supply  function  for this economy can  be written  as follows: 
y1 
—  (  -  ) + y  > 0;  y ￿  0 
where  y  is  the  rate of growth of output and  y is  the  rate  of growth of 
output compatible  with the  natural rate  of unemployment.  Throughout  thia 
paper  we assume  that the rate of inflation  can be controlled  directly  by the 
policymakers. 
10 
Electoral  competition  has  the  following  structure.  Every two periods, 
aay in periods  t — 0,  2,  4  Presidential  elections  are held;  in these 
elections  a President  and Congress  are elected: we refer  to "Congress"  as the 
unique  legislative  body.  In non-Presidential  elections  years  (i.e.  ,  t — 1, 
3, 5,  . . .)  a  new Congress  is elected.  The  two candidates  for  President  are 
labelled  D and R,  and  since  we do not  distinguish  between "candidates"  and 
"parties"  the two terms  are used interchangeably.  The objective  functions  of 
the  candidates,  defined  on  output  and  inflation  are  given  by  (the 
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The difference  in the  objectives  of the  two parties  can be captured  by  the 
following  inequalities: 
—D  R  D  K  0  K  x￿x  bab ;  (5) 
The two  parties  are not  identical  if at least  one of the three  inequalities 
in (5) holds strictly.  The first  one highlights  a difference  in the desired 
inflation  rate,  which tan be related  to a different  need for  the  inflation 
tax, for instance  because  the two parties disagree  about the optimal  level of 
government  spending.  The  second  and third  inequalities  capture  a different 
evaluation  of the costs  on inflation  and unemployment.  In order  to simplify 
- 
the  exposition  as much as possible,  we restritt the  differente  between  the 
two parties'  objectives  to the first  inequality  (which we assume  strict)  and 
we impose b0 — b5  — 0.  There  is no loss of generality  in this  simplification 
because  if  we  substitute  (2)  into  (3)  and  (4)  we  would  still  obtain 
unidimensional  objective  functions  on  inflation,  with different  optimal  and 
time tonsistent  policies  for the two parties.'1  Thus the objective  functions 
of  the two parties  are: 
u° 
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7 Voters,  like  the  candidates,  have  quadratic  preferences defined  on 
inflation  and know the preferences  of the  two  parties,  i.e.,  they  know (6) 
and (7).  We assume  a continuum  of  voters  where  the distribution  of  voters' 
bliss points (xt),  with i denoting  the  generic  voter,  is uniform.  Without 
further  loss  of  generality,  this  distribution  is  of  unit  length.  Its 
extremes  are given  by: 
[a, 
1 + a] 
where  a is a random  variable with zero mean distributed  on  [ammm,amah}.  We 
also impose  the following  inequalities: 
max  —R  —D  mit  a  <  x  <  x  <l+a 
which imply that  for any realization  of  voters'  preferences,  there  are voters 
with bliss  points  on both sides  of ;5and x?  The  distribution  of a and  the 
unit length of the voter distribution  are  "commOn knowledge".  Since  voters' 
preferences  are random,  the electoral  results  are probabilistic  even  if  there 
is no uncertainty  about  the policies  followed  by the two parties  if  elected. 
As a benchmark,  consider  the case in which "Congiess"  has no impact on 
the inflation  policy (or,  assume  that  "Congress"  does  not exist).  In this 
case, presidents  follow  these policies: 
R  —R  D  —D  —  x  ,  —  x , j — t, t+l 
Voters  rationally  expect  these policies  and  vote accordingly.  In  particular, 
each  voter  votes for the party  with the bliss  point  closest  to his own.  The 
probability  of electing the  D  is  then given by  the  probability  that the 
realization  of the random  variable  a is such  that  more than  50 percent  of the 
8 voters  have a bliss  point  closer  to than to x We indicate  this value  with 
p. 
Note that  in this  model  the  candidates  do not  convergence  fully  as in 
standard  median  voter models,  nor do they partially  converge  as in the case 
of ideologically  motivated candidates  studied  by Wittman (1977,  1983),  and 
Calverc  (1985) 
.  In  fact,  as  shown  in Alesina (1988b)  ,  the  two presidents 
cannot commit  to any platform  ocher  chan (10).  For instance,  if candidate  D 
could precommit  to a  preelectoral  platform he would choose a convergent 
policy,  lower  than  his bliss  point,  in order  to capture  (probabilistically) 
middle-of-the-road  voters.  However,  if  precommitments  are ruled  out,  voters 
know that when in office,  the  presidents  would follow  their  mdst preferred 
polities.  Thus,  latking  a precommitment  technology there  cannot be  any 
12 
policy  convergence. 
Expected  inflation  is given  by: 
— P  + (l-P)x5  t even  (11) 
t odd, 0 in office  (l2b) 
—  t odd, R in office  (l2b) 
Equations  (11)  and  (12)  underscore  that  in  the  first period of  a  new 
administration  there is expectation  uncertainty  because  contracts  have to be 
signed  before  the  elections.  In the  second period  expectations  are  correct 
since  the  public has  learned  the  identity  and thus the  preferences  of the 
policymaker  in office;  thus  there  is no uncertainty.  The implications  of 
(12)  for the output equation  are as follows: 
C  —D  —R  —  .  .  y  — y(l-P)(x 
-  x )  +  y  if 0 elected  in period  t  (13a) 
9 yR —  -iP(° 
-  KR)  + y  if R  elected  in period  t  (13b) 
— y  if  D or R elected  in period  t  (l3c) 
Thus,  a recession  occurs  in the first half of a Republican  administration  and 
an expansion  in the  first  half of a Democratic  administration.  There  is no 
difference  in output  in  the second  halves of the two administrations. 
These  sre the empirical  implications  successfully  tested  by Alesina and 
Sachs  (1988)  and Alesina (l988a).  We now proceed to consider the  role  of 
"Congress'  in this model,  by assuming  that  in the second  period  of his term 
of  office,  the President  is  constrained  in  policymaking  by the composition  of 
Congress.  Thus,  voters use  the  midterm election to  counterbalance  the 
President  in office:  in every  mid-term  election  the party  of the President 
in office  loses votes  relative  to the preceding  election. 
We assume that if an R  President  is in office in period t+l  (assuming 
that Presidential  elections  took place  in period t)  the inflation  policy is 
given  by: 
R  _xR÷kV  k>O  (14) 
t+t 
where  is  the  share  of votes  received by party D in  the  Congressional 
elections  held at the beginning  of period  t+1.  If President  D is in office 
in period  t+l the inflation  policy  is given  by: 
S  —0  .50 
—  x - q(l 
-  V  )  q  > 0  (15) 
where  V50 is  the  share  of votes  received by party D in  the  Congressional 
elections  held at the beginning  of period t+l.  V° and V°0 will be derived 
endogenously.  For simplicity  and with no loss  of generality  we also assume 
that: 
10 (16) 
The linearity  of the functions  (14) and (15) helps  in solving  the model  but 
it  is not crucial  for  the  qualitative  features  of  the  results.  In  other 
words,  the  results  derived below are  not  of the  "knife  edge"  type;  namely, 
they hold for  other  specifications  of relationships  between  and W°°  and 
and ltD  in which the  curvature  of the  function is not  too  far  from  t+i  t+1 
linearity.  Finally,  for expositional  purposes  we  assume,  for  the  moment, 
that in the first period  of his term  of  office  the President  is unconstrained 
by the composition  of Congress.'3 
The model  is solved  by backward induction,  in order  to insure  dynamic 
consistency;  thus, we start  from  the mid-term  elections  which take place in 
period  t÷1.  Consider  first  the case in which an R President  is in office  in 
period  t.  We want to find  under the sssumption  that the voters  know the 
effect  of  the composition  of Congress  on  policymaking,  namely  they know (14). 
We make use of  the following  notion  of  equilibrium: 
Definition:  A  voter equilibrium  occurs  if and only if no voter would 
prefer  a decrease  in  the expected  vote for the party  he voted for. 
Since  voters  have single peaked  preferences,  there  exists  s cutpoint in the 
distribution  of voters'  bliss  points,  labeled x*,  such that every  voter with 
s bliss point higher than x* votes  for party D and vice versa.  Given the 
uniform  distribution  (8), x* satisfies: 
VDR  l+sx*  (17) 
11 *  —o  *  —R 
It is immediate  to show (by contradiction)  that x  is such that x  >  x  > x 
The expected  utility  (when the President R  is in office) of voter i with 
a  bliss point  xt,  such that  > x  >  can be  written,  using  (14) and (17) 
14  as: 
tax 









We can then  establish  the following  result: 
Proposition  1:  The unique  cutpoint  x* is given  by:  x* — x5 
Proof:  Given our definition of  equilibrium,  a  necessary  and  sufficient 
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+ lc(l+ax*)  - 
x)kf(a)da 
(20) 
a  ax 
Remembering  that  af(a) — 0,  (20) implies that: 
if  x  ; l+k  Ox 
-  -  * 
Therefore  the unique cut poLnt is x  — 
1  + k 
Thus,  using (14),  (17) and the result  of proposition  1 we  obtain: 
12 —R  RI  e  *  x  Ei  I  — i  — x 
(21)  t+ij  t+i  1+k 
R  x  +k  — 
1  + k + ka 
(22) 
Consider the case  in  which a President  D is in office  in period  t and define 
the cutpoint  x by: 
V00 — I ÷  a - 
(23) 
By repeating  the same  procedure  described before  we obtain:15 
—D  JR  I  —  X  Eht  —  —  x — — 
(24)  t+ij  t+i  1+q 
—  +  qa  (25) 
cJe  now turn to the Presidential  election  of period t.  (Recall that  we 
are  assuming  that  in  the  first  period the President is unconstrained  by 
Co--ress).  The  voters have  all  the  information  necessary to know which 
policy  would  be followed  by the two parties  in period  t;  in addition  voters 
can compute  the  expected policies for period t+l  by using (21)  and  (24). 
Thus  in period  t voter i with  preferences  u1, votes  for D if and only if the 
following  holds: 
E{ut  [J 
+ flut 
{r0]  } 
> 
E{u {] 
+ flut [1r]  }  (26) 
Equation (26)  underscores  that  voter i  is better off if a D President  is 
elected in period t taking  account  of the  expected  effects  of the mid-term 
congressional  elections.  Thus,  the voters  for President  D have bliss  points 
13 satisfying  the following  inequality: 
s{[E[°]]- [s{j]2 
÷ var(a)(q2-  kz)} 
+  - 
(27) 
2{(°  R] 
+ fi[E[ir°J 
In  (27) 
E[ir°j 
and  are  defined  by  equations  (21)  and  (24)  and 
var(a)  is the variance  of a. 
Let us define  as  the bliss point of  the  voter who  is  indifferent 
between voting R or D for  President  in period t;  thus  is such that (27) 
holds  as an equality.  In Appendix  A, the following  result  is shown: 
Proposition  2:  If q — k,  then  the following  inequalities  hold: 
—R  *  A  — 
x  <x  <x<x<x.  (28) 
This result  is consistent  with the empirical  observation  that the party 
of  the  President always  loses  votes  in  mid-term elections.  In  fact 
Proposition  2 shows  that  there  are always  voters  who switch  from the party  of 
the  President  to  the  opposing  party  in  order  to  counterbalance the 
President's  policy in the second  half  of his term.  If q s  k, namely  one of 
the  two  potential  Presidents  is more  responsive  than  the  other  to  the 
composition  of  Congress,  the  inequalities  of Proposition  2  still  hold  if 
var(a) is not too big (see Appendix  A). 
Proposition 2  also  establishes  a  relationship  between the  economic 
outcome in the  first half of each administration  and the mid-term  electoraL 
results.  The basic point is that,  ceteris  paribus,  the more polarized  are 
the  two  parties  bliss  points,  i.e.,  the more distant  are  and , the 
14 bigger the deviation  of output  growth  from ita natural  level  and the larger 
the frattion  of voters  switching  from  one party  to the other  in the mid-term 
elections.  In fact,  consider  an increase  in the distance  between  and 
such that the  cutpoint  of the  Presidential  election () remains  unchanged; 
thus the probability  of electing  President  D or R remains  unchanged.  In  this 
situation,  from (13) it follows that the deviation  of output  from its natural 
level  (y)  increases,  i.e.  ,  one observes  a  bigger  expansion  (recession)  in  the 
first  half of a 0,  KR)  administration.  For  instance,  consider the  case  in 
—R  *  which  R wins the Presidential  electiona.  Since x  has decreased,  so does x 
[from  (21)}.  This implies  that a larger  fraction  of voters switches  from 
party  R to party  0 in  sid-term elections. 
The same qualitative  implications  for the mid-term  electoral  cycle holds 
if Congress  is elected  every  period,  i.e. ,  in Presidential  election  years  as 
well  as  in  off  years.  In  this  case,  the  voters  can  achieve  some 
counterbalancing  effect in the  first  period  too.  The  complete solution  of 
this  case  is presented more extensively  in Aleaina and Rosenthal (1988). 
Here we simply  sketch  the solution  of the first  period  problem,  in order  to 
show  that  the mid-term  electoral  cycle  survives  this generalization. 
When  both  elections  (Congressional  and  Presidential)  occur 
contemporaneously  in the  first  period  two  cutpoints  are  relevant:  Y,  the 
cutpoinc  for  the  Presidential  election  and  the  cutpoint  for  the 
Congressional  election,  the  expected  utility  of voter i  depends  upon both 
curpoints.  Let us  define  as  "interior"  an equilibrium  in which  and 
satisfy  the following  conditions: 
15 3EU(,°)  —  o 
ox  sAP 
x  —x 
8EU(Y,) 
Alesina and  Rosenthal  (1988)  show  that,  in  general,  an  "interior" 
equilibrium  exists  and  fully  characterize  it.  The  first  period  equilibrium 
in  general  manifests  ticket-splitting,  i.e.  . For  the purpose  of the 
present  paper it is sufficient  to establish  the following  result: 
Prooosition :  If an  interior  equilibrium  in the first period exists,  then: 
*  Ac  — 
x  <x <x 
Proof:  Suppose not.  For given ,  Q'  satisfies  the following  condition: 
i  A?  AC  Di  A?  C  Ri  A?  AC 
dEU  (x ,x  )  —  3EU  (x  ,x  + (l-P)8  ' ,x  —  0  (31) 
AC  AC  As  dx  dx  jAC  dx  IAC 
x—x  x—x 
where  P — probability of electing  a  Democratic  president,  which  is a constant 
for a given  EU5.)  — expected  utility  of voter I if D is  elected  and 
EU51(.) —  expected  utility  if R elected.  It is immediate  to show that if 
Di A? AC  Ri A? AC 
*  AC  —  dEU  (x,x)  dEU  (xx) 
s x  or x  x,  and  either  have the same sign or 
Ac  Ac 
dx  dx 
one  is  zero  and the  other  non-zero.  Therefore (31)  cannot be  satisfied. 
Q.E.D. 
The  intuition  of this result  is straightforward.  If, say,  c x* then the 
voters  with bliss points  xi such that  < xt  <  x*  act  as follows:  in the 
first  period,  under uncertainty  about  the  President's  identity,  they vote 0 
for  Congress:  this  implies  that they would want  to  counterbalance  an R 
16 president.  In rhe  second  period  when they know that  an R president  is  in 
office,  they switch  to voting  R for  Congress,  reducing  the  counterbalancing 
At  *  effect.  This behavior cannot be  rational,  thus  x  <  x  cannot be  an 
Ac  — 
equilibrium.  Analogous  argumenc  holds  for x  > x. 
3.  Azarezate  Results £  Congressional  Elections  1950-1984 
Our  empirical  analysis  focuses  on House  and Senate  elections  from 1950 
to 1984.  Undoubtedly,  some previous  investigators  had shied  away  from Senate 
data because  only two-thirds  of the states hold Senate  elections  in a given 
election  year.  In  fact,  results  for the Senate  are qualitatively  similar  to 
those  for  the  House.  Testing  for  "class"  effects  by  including duassy 
variables  generally  proved  negative.16 
Incumbency  Models 
We begin our  data analysis  by considering  the  simplified  model of the 
political process  developed  in  the  preceding  section.  In  the  model,  we 
assumed  a perfectly  stable  environment  except  for the stochastic  variation  in 
the  distribution of  voter  ideal  points;  conaequently,  no  variation is 
predicted  in the Presidential  vote other  than that induced  by the stochastic 
process.  Thus,  the simple  model  does  not suggest any systematic  variation  in 
either  the  Presidential  vote or the Congressional  vote itt  "on" years.17  In 
"off" years,  in contrast,  the model predicts  an increase  in the vote for the 
Republicans  when the  Democrats  hold the White  House  and vice-versa.  Given 
the  small  number of data points,  we assume  the  two balancing  effects  to be 
equal.  Thus,  we have the following  specification: 
V  -j3+flM+e  (32)  5,1  0  1  1  t 
where  V  Republican  Percentage  of  Two Party vote in year t. 
17 +1, if  Oem.  Incumbent  Pres.  and t is "off' year 
-I,  if  Rep.  Incumbent  Pres.  and t ia "off" year. 
0, otherwise 
and  satisfiea  the standard  OLS assumptions  (consistent with our model.) 
As to the coefficients,  we hypothesize  $,  >  0.  As shown in Column 
1 of Tables 2A and 2B,  the simple model is  supported  by  the  data,  with 
conventional  significance  levels  at 0.05 or  better.  The model predicts  that 
the  two-party  vote will split  near its  long-term  average  in Presidential 
years  and favor  the  "outs" by 3.2%  in the  Senate  and  1.8%  in the  House  in 
midterm  elections. 
Our simple model captures part of  the aggregate  fluctuations,  but lesves 
much unexplained  variante.  An  alternative  model emphasizes  a  systematic 
incumbency  effect  pertaining  to both on and off years.  We thus define 
+1, if Democrat  Incumbent  President 
-1,  if Republican  Incumbent  President 
This incumbency  variable was  included in the  specifications  of Kramer 
(1971)  and Fair (1978,  1982,  1987).  As seen in Column 2  of Table  2,  the 
standard incumbency  variable,  by itself,  does  not furnish  explanatory  power 
beyond  that available  in  the midterm  model. 
In addition  to the standard  incumbency  variable,  Fair has considered  an 
additional  incumbency  measure.  He  defines 
DEP?.  —  +1,  if Democrat  Incumbent  President  runs for 
t  reelection  in an "on" year. 
-1,  if Republican  Incumbent  President  runs  for 
reelection  in an "on" year. 
0,  otherwise 
Following  Fair  (1987),  Gerald Ford is  treated  as a non-incumbent  in 
18 1976.  As shown in Column  3 of Table 2,  inclusion  of DEPR  by itself  leavea 
our estimate  of the midterm  effect  virtually  unaffected,  although  the fit for 
the Senate  is improved  substantially.  However,  when H,  I,  snd DEPR are  all 
included in the  model,  there  is  a strong increase  in fit  and the  midterm 
effect  becomes unimportant  (Column  4).  Indeed,  of the  various incumbency 
models,  the best,  in terms  of the  cx post estimated  standard  error,  model 
includes  only  I  and DEPR,  shown in Column  (5)  of  Table  2. 
With respect  to the results  in Column  (5), note that a midterm  effect  is 
still  maintained.  It is given by the coefficient  on I  and  is 2.1% in the 
House  and 3.3% in the Senate, quite  close  to  the original  estimates  in  Column 
(1).  On the other hand,  Column  (5) contrsdicts  the simple  model's hypothesis 
of only random  variation  in Presidential  years.  When the incumbent  runs  for 
reelection,  his  Congressional  party  reaps  benefits  (equal  to  the  I 
coefficient  -  the  DEPR coefficient).  This incumbency  bonus  is 1.1%  in the 
House  and 3.2% in  the Senate. 
The DEPR results need,  however,  to  be viewed  with caution.  If we let 1* 
*  —  I  -  H,  then regressing  on I  and  H is equivalent  to regressing  on I and H. 
In  turn,  DEPR  differs  from  1* only in  its treatment  of 4 observations,  one of 
which involves  the dubious  coding  of Ford. As Fair (1987)  also noted  for  the 
Presidency,  changing  the  Ford  coding decision substantially  alters  the 
results.  The column (4)  R2 values  drop from  0.546  to 0.400  for the House and 
from  0.796  to 0.678  for the Senate.  The OEPR  coefficient  is not significant 
at  the  0.05  level  in  either  Column  (4)  or  (5)  for  the  House.  Mote 
fundamentally,  DEPR is not entirely  a variable that  is predetermined  before 
the electoral  period.  Truman  in 1952 and Johnson  in 1968 were  both eligible 
for reelection.  In  both casee,  their  decision not to pursue  another term  may 
19 have reflected  their  and their  party's  temporary  unpopularity  as s result of 
prolonged  military conflicts  in  Asia.  Consequently,  DEPR might well be 
regarded as  an endogenous  variable,  and columns  (3) 
-  (5)  are  subject  to 
simultaneous  equations  bias.'8 
What is truly predetermined  is whether  the  chief  executive  is a lame 
duck.  Only two observations  in our  sample,  1960  and  1976,  are  in this  lame 
duck situation.  If 0EPR is recoded to differentiate  lame  ducks  from others, 
there  is a further  drop  in  R2,  to 0.363  for Column (4)  for  the House  and to 
0.526  for  the House,  while  the  lesser  improvement  afforded over  Column (2) 
now depends  solely  on two observations,  1960  and 1976.  All in  all,  there  is 
reason  to regard  the DEPR effects with skepticism.  Nonetheless,  the results 
suggest  that Presidential  election  years  contain  important  lagged  incumbency 
effects  that are  not  captured in our  simple  model,  which treats  each four 
year term  as an  independent  event. 
Economic  Influences  Models 
Another set  of alternatives  to  our  simple  model is  posed by  various 
models of economic influences  on voting behavior.  The  essence  of  the 
Krsmer-Fair  models  is that the incumbent  does well ingood  times.  Growth  in 
real per capita GNP,  real per capita  income, unemployment,  and the inflation 
rate  have been used as indicators  of performance.  Fair and Kramer  find the 
strongest  effects  for  the  first  two  indicators  and Bloom and  Price  (1975) 
consider  only the  second.  Consequently,  we restrict  ourselves  to the  first 
two  measures denoted by  g  and  i  respectively.'9  Because  we  have  few 
observations,  and in order  to avoid  collinearity,  we use  these  measures  one 
st a time.  Kramer (1971),  Fair (1978), and Zloom and Price (1975)  all use 
annual  data  for the year of the election.  Fair (1987)  concludes  in  favor  of 
20 even shorter  voter horizons  and used data for  the second and third quarters 
preceding  the election.  We consider both  variants. 
There  are several  possible models.20  One, noted  by Kramer  for historical 
reasons, but not investigated,  is that the Republicans  do well in good  times. 
From the  viewpoint  of our  theoretical  model,  this "traditional"  lore  is  in 
fact  plausible,  since  "good  times",  defined in terms  of high GNP growth, but 
with inflation,  should tend to  occur  in  the  first  half of a Oemocrstic 
Presidency.  The  regressor  for  this model, when GNP  is the indicator,  would 
simply  be g.  In the  Kramer-Fair  models,  good times  favor  the  incumbent  so 
the regressor  is -gI.  Bloom  and Price  adapt  the Kramer  model  to allow  for a 
"switching"  regression.  In recessions  (g < 0)  ,  voters  react  to performance 
more than  in expansions.  The Bloom-Price  model  can be  written: 
V  — $+ $[-ggl] 
+  + 
Ct  (33) 
where g  — 1  if  g  > 0 
— 0  otherwise. 
The  hypothesis  of the model  is that  > 
In contrast to  these  models,  our  simple  approach suggests  that  if 
economic factors  relate  to  voting at  all  it  will  only  be  a  spurious 
correlation  produced  by  the  expectation  uncertainty  of economic  agents  end 
the moderating  behavior  of  voters.  The relevant  economic  variable  should  be 
deviation  from trend.  We consider  (g  -  m)2I,  where  a is a  target  level  for 
the economy.  As in the other  models,  the coefficient  on this variable  should 
be  positive.  We either  set m equal  to the average  growth  rate of  the economy 
over  the  time  period of  our  data set  or  treat  a  as  a  parameter  to  be 
estimated  by non-linear  least  squares,  Another  interpretation  of this model 
is that voters are  retrospective  but  more  "sophisticated"  than the  "naive" 
21 voters of Kramer,  Fair,  and Bloom and Price.  Sophiaticated  voters do not 
view too high growth  in the short  run as desirable.  Such growth  may be seen 
as potentially  inflationary  or, more generally,  voters  prefer  a stable  growth 
path  rather  than  fluctuations  of  growth.21 
Note  that  not  all  observations  discriminate  among  the  models.  Our 
squared deviation  model  will look  much like  a Republican  prosperity  model  as 
long  as prosperity  occurs  when the Democrats  are in office  and  recessions 
occur  during Republican administrations.  Similarly,  squared  deviations 
parallel  Bloom and Price  in calling  for recessions  to be severely  punished. 
Squared  deviations  and Kramer-Fair  basically  agree  for  g<m.  Consequently, 
with  only  18  observations  it  is  difficult  to  discriminate  between  the 
models 
We begin our discussion  of "economic"  models  by considering  simple  GNP 
models,  using growth  rates  from the year of election,  as shown  in Table  3. 
An immediate  observation  is  that  none of the models  substantially  outperform 
any  of  the  incumbency  models,  including  the  very  simple  midterm effects 
model.  The Kramer-Fair  model  does particularly  poorly,  and  the Bloom-Price 
model also does  not  do very well.  None of  these  "naive"  retrospective 
regressions  passes  the standard  0.05 level. In terms of the standard  error  of 
the  estimate  (SE)  both  are  dominated  by  the  "Prosperity"  and  "Squared 
Deviation"  models.  The  negative results  for  the  Kramer-Fair  and  Bloom and 
Price  models  are  important  when viewed in the  context of  these  authors' 
results.  In Kramer's  original  paper,  a simple economic  model, based on real 
income,  was  highly significant.  As he  added  variables  to  this  initial 
regression,  the economic  growth  variable  remained the driving  variable.  In 
the  case  of  Bloom  and  Price,  the  simple  model was  the  only one  they 
22 presented.  Our  results  indicate that  these  earlier  retrospective  voting 
models  are not robust  to alterations  in the time period  and data series. 
The  "Prosperity"  model does poorly  for the House but quite  well for the 
Senate.  The  "Squared  Deviation"  model  with fixed a  is  more stable.  The 
squared  deviation  variable  is  significant  for  both  houses.  The  slope 
estimates  for the House  and Senate  are quite  similar.  Estimating  the "target" 
parameter  a improves  the  fit  slightly  in the House  and substantially  in the 
Senate.  The data,  however,  do not permit  obtaining  precise  estimates  of both 
a and  the  coefficient  on the  squared  deviation.  We thus cannot  reject  the 
null hypothesis that a — 2.959,  the  average  GNP growth  rate in the  1950-84 
period.  On  the  whole,  the  evidence in  Tables  2  and  3  is at  least  as 
supportive  of our balancing  model  than of retrospective  voting  models. 
Result 1.  Simple retrospective  voting models do not  outperform  the 
alternative  model  that Republicans  do  well under prosperity. 
Result 2.  Simple retrospective  voting models do not outperform the 
alternative  model that  incumbents  are punished  for deviations  from a target 
level of  growth. 
Result  3.  None of the models  based on GNP growth  rates  for the year of 
the  election fits  the  data substantially  better  than  the  simple  midterm 
effect  model [Column  (1)  of  Table  2.] 
One important  claim  of  proponents  of retrospective  voting  models  is that 
the horizon employed  by the voters is very short.  However,  our  theoretical 
model  would suggest  that two  years,  rather  than one  year,  prior to  the 
election would  be  relevant.  The  reason  is  that  the  spurious  correlation 
between  voters'  moderating  behavior  and the partisan  business  cycle  is likely 
to be improved  by  the  averaging  implied  by  including  data for  both years 
23 prior  to an election.  Consequently,  we reestimated  all  the models shown  in 
Table  3 by also  including  all relevant  variables  lagged  one  year.  Results 
are  shown in Table 4.  To  save  space,  we  group  the  g  variables  for  the 
various  models  in a block of lines.  The variables and  their  order  are  as 
shown  in  Table  3. 
Our hypothesis concerning  the  squared deviation  models  is  confirmed. 
For fixed  m, both lagged  coefficients  are significant.23  Consistent  with the 
averaging  we expected,  we cannot  reject  the hypothesis  that the coefficients 
on  the squared  deviation  variables  are equal  When  a is estimated,  there  is a 
significant  improvement  in the log-likelihood  for both  houses.  At the  same 
time,  the retrospective  voting  models  are "improved"  for the Senate  (but not 
the  House)  .  The  F-test  for  Kramer-Fair  is  significant.  The  driving 
variable,  with  the  wrong sign,  is lagged GNP.  Bloom  and Price's  lagged 
recession  variable is also significant.  Their  model shows  at least  as large 
an effect from negative  growth  one year prior  to the election  as in the year 
of the election.  Although  the coefficients  are not estimated  precisely,  the 
House  runs are  similar-  -  retrospective voting  models  show larger  effects  from 
the lagged  data. 
Result  4.  The data do not support  the claims  of voter  myopia  found in 
the retrospective  voting  literature. 
Result 5.  The squared  deviation  models are significantly  improved by 
including  CliP data for the year  preceding  the election year. 
To address  the emphasis found  in Krsmer  and Bloom  and Price,  we redid 
all the regressions  in Tables  3 and 4 using i in  place  of g.  For brevity,  we 
summarize  the results  in the following  statement. 
Result  6.  The income measure  is not a good candidate  for an explanatory 
24 variable  in simple  economic  models  of aggregate  Congressional  voting.  The 
fits are generally  worse than  those  for  the CNP variable;  when the fits are 
better, coefficient  values  are not as hypothesized  by the naive  retrospective 
voting  models. 
In his series  of studies  on Presidential  voting,  Fair  has also  focused 
on teal CNP  as  the  main predictor.  Fair  (1987)  claims  (at  least  fot 
Presidential  elections)  that it is mainly  per capita growth  in the second  and 
third  quarters  of an election year that  matters.  Consequently,  we  also 
estimated  the models of Table  3 and the no lags  columns  of Table  3 with g 
redefined  to be the annualized  per capita growth  in quarters  2  and 3 of year 
Again the results  are negative.  The Prosperity  and Kramer-Fair  models 
are always worse for the  two-period  growth  rate than for the growth rate for 
all  of the  election year.  The  squared  deviation  model  is better for  the 
House, with incumbency  and trend, worse  elsewhere.  The Bloom  and Price  model 
does better in the House  run  (R2 — 0.292  vs.  0.184) but worse  in the Senate 
(0.087 vs 0.213). 
Our  comparisons  of the various  models  of economic  influences  on voting 
behavior  have been  limited  to simple  linear regressions  including  an  economic 
variable  and its lag or, in the case of Bloom  and Price,  a piecewise  linear 
regression.  The  literature,  however,  includes  variables  that  measure 
non-economic  influences.  Specifically,  both  Kramer  and Fair included  I and t 
(time  trend)  as  additional regressors.  Results,  presented  in  Table  5, 
comparing  the Kramer-Fair  model  and the Squared  Deviation  model  when I and t 
are included,  are quite  instructive. 
All the results  in  Table  5 must  be viewed  with  caution,  given  the number 
of coefficients  relative  to degrees  of freedom.  Indeed,  only two of the  8 
25 F-tests  (testing  the  null  hypothesis  that  all  coefficients,  save  the 
constant,  are  zero)  for  the overall  regression  are  significant  at the  0.05 
level.  Neither  of the  two models  dominates.  Without the  lagged  variable, 
the Kramer-Fair  model always has a better fit than the  squared  deviation. 
Indeed,  the lagged variable does not  noticeably improve  the  fit  for  this 
specification,  in  line  with  the  previous  restroapective  voting  lore. 
However,  the  Squared Deviation  model, with the lag,  is nearly  as good  as the 
Kramer-Fair  model  for the House  and substantially  better  for the Senate. 
Result 7.  In a  specification  including  an Incumbency  variable  and  a 
time trend,  there  is no  clear  case  for a Kramer-Fair  retrospective  voting 
model based  on short  memory  vs. a Squared  Deviation  Model in which lags are 
important. 
What is most interesting  about  Table  5,  however,  is the pattern of the 
coefficients.  Introducing  incumbency  into  the  Kramer-Fair  model makes  a 
dramatic  difference in  fit.  (Compare  Table  5  with  Tables  3  and  4). 
Incumbency  costs  the  "ins"  about  2.2%  of the vote in the House  and  3.5%  in 
the  Senate.  These  figures  are  quite  close  to our  original  estimate  of the 
midterm  effect.  While  GNP growth now has the correct  sign,  it clearly  has a 
subsidiary  role to incumbency  and has  a significant  coefficient  only in the 
House runs.  For  GNP  growth  to have an  effect  roughly  equal  to  that of 
incumbency,  growth  would  have  to fall from its average  level  of around  3% to 
about  -2%-  -a major recession  level  attained by only 1982  in  the  data or 
accelerate  to 8%-  -a boom  level  that occurred  only  before  the 1950 election. 
In  contrast to  the  Kramer-Fair  model,  the  Squared Deviation model 
estimates  never show a significant  incumbency  effect.  The estimates  are 
never as much as one-third  those  in  the corresponding  Kramer-Fair  model;  the 
26 estimates  for incumbency  are actually  negative  in the  lagged  model.  Adding 
incumbency  helps  the overall  fit of the original  simple model only slightly. 
The GNP coefficient  estimates  retain the  signs  found  in Tables  3  and 4  but 
are significant  only  in the lsgged  model  for  the Senate.  What has  happenad 
is  that the  coefficients  are  not  precisely  estimated  as a  result of  the 
predicted  colinearity  between  I  and (go)2I. 
When we run a full (less  the weak,  non-significant  inflation  variable) 
Fair (1987) model by including  DEPR,  we obtain  results  similar  to the  simple 
regression  shown  in Table  2.  Just as the  11  coefficient  was  near zero  when 
both I  and  DEPR were included,  the  Squared  Deviation  coefficients  are  near 
zero  when  DEPR  is  added  to  the  model  of  Table  5.  While  the  naive 
retrospective  & variable  is slightly  more successful  in this context  (again a 
lagged version  is  more  favorable  to  Squared  Deviations)  the  critical 
variables  in Fair's specifications  are  non-economic.  In both houses,  the 
change  in GNP  growth  from the  average  would have to be  over  10%  for  the 
estimated  impact to equal  that of I.  Such a change  is beyond  all the  sample 
values  of g.  Similarly,  according  to the DEPR  model,  a party  will gain  more 
from getting its  incumbent  to  stand for  another  term than it could ever 
possibly  achieve  by successful  management  of the economy.  Although  the DEPR 
model puts a twist  on Presidential  factors  not captured  in our  model,  the 
basic empirical  results  square  with the thrust  of  our model  --  elections  are 
not driven  by economic  performance  but by  forces  internal  to the  political 
process. 
Our simple  theory,  of course,  also predicts that  the Squared  Deviation 
model will  not  improve  on  the  simple  midterm effect variable M.  This 
observation  brings us directly to our empirical  punch line.  Neither GNP 
27 variable  improves  on  our simple  midterm  effect  model.  We show this  in  Table 
6, where the I dummy variable  in Table 5 has simply been replaced  by H (The I 
variable still  appears  in  the  g variables.)  Substituting  H  for  I  in  a 
classical  Kramer  model is something  of a draw-  -  the  House  results  are  worse 
and the Senate  results are better.  In both cases,  however,  CNP growth  has  a 
negligible  effect.  The  only significant  coefficient  appears  in the  lagged 
Senate  model,  but there  the lagged  coefficient  has  the wrong sign while  the 
sum  of  the  two  coefficients  is  roughly  zero.  A similar  story  holds for 
Squared  Deviations.  Here the  is better than with I for both Senate and 
House.  No coefficients  are  significant  in the  House  run whereas  they are 
significant  when H and Squared  Deviations  are  run  separately.  The lack of 
significance  in Table  6 reflects  the anticipated  colinearity  between  the  two 
variables.  One  lagged  coefficient  is  significant  in the  Senate,  but,  no 
surprise  at  this point,  the unlagged  coefficient has the wrong  sign. 
Result  8.  Simple models  of  economic  influences  add little,  if anything, 
to the basic midterm  effects model. 
4. 
- Conclusion 
We have  presented  a very simple but internally  consistent  macro  model  of 
an economic and political  system.  The model  is  obviously  very crude,  and 
further  theoretical  work is in  order, on both  bringing  in  dynamice  that would 
enrich  the  two period  focus  of  the  current model  and on relaxing  simplifying 
technical  assumptions.  The  model  we have presented  does,  however,  capture 
some  critical  features of some modern  political  systems. 
The economic  side of the  model  accounts  for  the notion that  economic 
agents  cannot  be  routinely  fooled  by  the  government.  With  rational 
28 expectations,  anticipated  efforts at manipulating  the economy  should  have no 
effect  on the  real level  of output.  On the  other  hand,  agents  enter into 
contracts  that are  sufficiently  long-term  such  that  they  can only attempt 
more or  less  successfully  to  hedge  against  the  uncertainty  generated  by 
politics. 
In addition  to the assumption  of  voters'  rationality,  the political  side 
of  the  model  has  three  key  features  (1)  a  two-party  system  in  which 
politicians  are  polarized;  (2)  policy reflects  the  influence  of both the 
executive  and the legislature;  (3)  an institutional  structure where there are 
legislative  elections  while the  executive  remains  in  power.  The  United 
States  and France are the  two nations  thst are  reasonably  good fits to our 
stylized  environment. 
The  upshot of  our  stylized "political  economy"  is  that  political 
polarization  and uncertainty  generates  economic  fluctuations  and that voters 
use the  legislative  elections  to attenuate  the  policy  swings  engendered  by 
polarization.  Within  the context of  our model,  these  concurrent  economic  and 
political events  generate  a  purely spurious  correlation  between  current 
economic  conditions  and  voting  behavior  in  the legislative  elections. 
In the  empirical  section  of the paper,  we saw evidence  of the spurious 
correlation.  The  midterm  effect portrayed  by  our  model  was  strongly 
supported  by  the  data,  while various "economic"  models of voting behavior 
failed  to generate much additional  explanatory  power. 
Our  empirical  results  help to reconcile  the  findings  from survey  data 
that individual  voting  behavior is not  responsive  to changes  in individual 
economic  outcomes (Kinder and Kiewiet,  1979;  Kiewiet,  1981)  and the supposed 
regularity that aggregate  voting behavior responds  to  aggregate  economic 
29 conditions.  While  Kramer  (1979)  provided  an  elegant  methodological 
reconciliation  based on the observation  that the  survey  questions  failed  to 
differentiate  overall  individual  changes  in  economic  fortunes  from  the 
portion of the change the  individual  attributed  to government,  our  findings 
question the  existence  of the  regularity  for  the  postwar  period,  at  least 
insofar  as Congressional  elections  are concerned. 
The  near  zero  correlations  we  have  obtained  between  standard 
"retrospective"  regressors  and Conaressional  outcomes  contrasts  with the very 
high B. values  Fair (1987) has obtained  for Presidential  elections.  t4arkus 
(1988), using  survey  data,  also finds strong  support for retrospective  voting 
using survey  data for  the  1956-84  period.25  It is thus quite  possible that 
both retrospective  and moderating  influences  are present.  In voting for the 
Presidency,  voters  use  the past to evaluate  the current  Presidential  party, 
but,  having selected  the chief  executive,  invariably  choose moderation  in the 
off year elections. 
Our model has  also  not considered  many other  important  influences  on 
voting  behavior,  most notably  the incentive  that  each voter has to feather 
his constituency's  Congressional  nest by continuing  to  reelect  the  current 
incumbent.  The  incumbency  incentives  are  probably the  major  factor in 
limiting  the midterm  effect  to only about  2.5%  of the electorate.  That the 
midterm  effect  exists  at all responds  to the fact that  open seats  arise  and 
to  the  possibility  that many  individuals  (professors  who  participate  in 
national labor  markets,  retirees)  are  more responsive  to  the  direction of 
national  economy policy  than to increments  to local pork. 
30 ENDNOTES 
'See the seminal works  by Kramer  (1971), Nordhaus  (1975), and  Hibbs  (1977). 
2See, however,  the controversy  between  Beck (1982,  l984b)  and Hibbs  (1983). 
Hibbs  (1987) has recently showed  additional  empirical  evidence in favor  of 
his view.  For empirical  evidence  in  European  countries  see Alt (1985) 
3Chappell  (1983)  and Chappell  and Keech  (1985) also developed  macro  political 
economy models  from this perspective. 
'We treat  these preferences  as  exogenous  and do not model them.  The presence 
of polarization  during the  postwar  period is supported  not only by  casual 
observation 
. but  also  by  empirical  studies  of  voter  evaluations  of 
Presidential  candidates  (Poole  and  Rosenthal,  l984a)  of  interest  group 
evaluations  of  members  of  Congress  (Poole  and  Daniels,  1985,  Poole  and 
Rosenthal,  l984b)  and of  roll  call voting patterns  (Poole  and  Rosenthal, 
1985a,  l985b) 
5Note that labor  contracts  may last one, or even two years;  thus even though 
some elections  may not  be very uncertain say  two  or  three  months before 
November,  the electoral  uncertainty  relevant  to these  economic  decisions  is 
present  say 12 or even 18 months  before  the election. 
6Split-ticket  voting  undoubtedly  also responds  to many  other influences,  such 
as incumbency  advantage  and ethnic  preference. 
'See Alesina  and Tabellini  (1987) and McKibbin,  Roubini  and Sachs  (1987)  for 
two party  models  with state variables  which  link  each  administration  with its 
successors. 
5For  models with  learning  and  asymmetric  information,  see  Cukierman  and 
Meltzer (1986),  Alesina and  Cukierman  (1987), Rogoff and Sibert  (1988)  and 
Rogoff  (1987) 
5For some  results more favorable  to Nordhaus  see Naynes  and Stone  (1987)  and 
Crier (1987). 
'°Alternatively,  the model  could  be closed  by a quantity  theory  equation  such 
as m 
—  +  where m  is the rate of  money  growth;  in this case one could 
assume  that the policymakers  control money  growth  rather than inflation.  The 
shortcut adopted in  the text simplifies  the notation  without  affecting  in any 
way  the  results.  In  this  paper,  we  disregard  the  issue  of  the  partial 
independence  of the Federal Reserve.  See Alesina  (1988a) on this  issue  in a 
related  context. 
"This simplification  eliminates  the  issue  of time  inconsistency  of optimal 
monetary policy in rational expectations  models  pointed out by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) and Barro  and Gordon (1983).  The time inconsistency  arises 
if  the  unexpected inflation  term  enters  the  utility functions  of  the  two 
parties.  By not including  output  in the objective  functions  such  a term  does 
not  appear.  Alesina  (1987,  1988a)  and  Alesina  and  Sachs  (1988)  show 
extensively  how to deal  with this problem  in two-party models. 
31 '2Policy convergence  can  be achieved  only if che electoral  game is modelled  as 
a repeated  gsme,  so that reputational  mechanisms  can be accounted  for.  See 
Alesina (1988b),  Alesina  and Cukierman  (1987), Alesina and Spear (1987)  for 
repeated  electoral  gaines  with  ideologically  motivated  politicians  and 
Ferejohn (1986)  and Rogoff and Sibert (1988)  for  repeated electoral  games 
with purely office motivated  politicians.  In this paper  we do not  consider 
reputational  mechanisms;  i.e.  ,  we  consider  every  election  as a one-shot  game. 
tSThe  specification  adopted for  the  effect  of Congress on policymaking  is 
perhaps  more appropriate  for  the case  of proportional  representation,  which 
does  not apply  to the United  States  Congress. 
t4Note that (18)  would not  represent  the  correct  expected  utility for the 
voters  with bliss  points  x  such that x  < amn or x  > 1 +  In fact by 
knowing their preferences,  and that  the preference  distribution  is uniform, 
these voters  can infer something  about the realization  of the random variable 
a.  Thus their  expected  utility  is  given  by  (18).  Since,  however,  the 
cut point  voter  x* has to lie in between  and Zr',  given condition  (9),  this 
consideration  does  not affect  the proof of Proposition  1. 
'5Note  that  in  the  model  with  Congress,  the  realization of  the  random 
variable  a tan generate  unexpected  inflation  or deflation  even in the second 
period  of any administration. 
'6Like Fair (1987), we report  results  based on the  latest revisions  of  the 
data, which in  the case of  GNP, have  been quite  substantial.  However,  such  a 
choice  is problematic.  Kramer (1979) argues  that one should  model  voters  as 
basing  their  decisions  not on  changes in their total  income but on  changes  in 
income  that they attribute  to governmental  activity.  However,  one may argue 
that  voters'  assessments  reflect  the  "real"  economy  rather  than  the 
"unrevised"  announcements  made  by  the  government  in  the  period before 
election.  We have checked  our analysis with respect  to CNP data  by using the 
CITIBASE series prior to the  1986  revisions.  The results  from the  oldec 
series  are  somewhat  more  favorable  to  the  argument  advanced in  this 
paper. 
"We  do not intlude  Presidential  voting  in this paper.  We completely  agree 
with Fair  (1978),  who,  citing  work by Lepper (1974),  argues  that  it was 
unreasonable  for  Kramer  (1971)  to  have  estimated  a  model  in  which 
Presidential and  House  elections  were considered in a  single  model with 
constrained  coefficients. 
'80f course,  it might  well make sense, in the  spirit  of Fair's research,  to 
include  DEPR in a  short-term  (Truman announced  his  withdrawal  on March 12, 
1952 and Johnson on  March 30,  1968) forecasting  model. 
t9Our work uses real GNP  (net per capita).  Results  for  annual  per  capita 
growth  rates  are very similar to those presented  here. 
20See also  Arcelus  and Meltzer  (1975) and Tufte  (1975) 
2This view of  the model is congruent  with  the approach  of  Chappell  (1986) and 
Chappell and  Keech  (1986).  The  model  with  squared  deviation  also  is 
congruent  with Lepper's  (1974) finding that incumbents  lose votes  when either 
unemployment  or inflation  is high. 
32 221n order  to gain degrems  of freedom,  observations  from the  interwar  period 
could  be used.  In this  case,  however,  one has to make  more and more heroic 
assumptions  about  the stability  of the politico-economic  environment  and thus 
about the  stability  of  coefficients.  In  addition,  if  one  excludes the 
observations  affected by  the  two  World Wars and  by  the  Great  Depression, 
there  are very few useful observations  can be obtained for  years  prior  to 
1950 in  this century. 
23For the House,  the F-test, which is equivalent  to a two-tailed  t-test  here, 
is not significant  whereas  the one-tailed  t-test on  the lagged  variable  is. 
24Like Fair (1987),  we used G  q 
real  GNP  for  quarter  q  in year t  from 
CITIBASE  file GNP82  and P  — quarterly  population  figures  that Fair  obtained 
from  the Council  of  Economic Advisors.  We computed  g  from  the formula: 
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Rate of Growth  of GNP 
(Constant  Prices) 
Democratic  Administrations 
First  Second  Third  Fourth 
Truman  0.0  8.5  10.3  3.9 
Kennedy/Johnson  2.6  5.3  4.1  5.3 
Johnson  5.8  5.8  2.9  4.1k 
Carter  4.7  5.3  2.5  -0.2 
Average  3.3  6.2  5.0  3.3 
Average 
First/Second  Halves  4.8  4.1 
Republican  Administrations 
First  Second  Third  Fourth 
Eisenhower  I  4.0  -1.3  5.6  2.1 
Eisenhower  II  1.7  -0.8  5.8  2.2 
Nixon  2.4  -0.3  2.8k  5.0 
Nixon/Ford  5.2  -0.5  -1.3  4.9 
Reagan I  1.9  -2.5  3.6  6.4 
Reagan II  2.7  2.5 
Average  3.0  -0.5  3.3  4.1 
Average 
First/Second  Halves  1.2  3.7 
Source:  Economic  Report  of the President  1987. 
*  Oil Shocks 
34 Table 2. 
Incumbency Regressions 
A. House of Representatives 
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DEPR 

















1.24  1.14 
B.  Senate 
(2)  (3) 
47.671  47.662  47.500  47.500  47.504 
(0.702)  (0.727)  (0.598)  (0.439)  (0.424) 
3.213  3.368  3.194  -0.239 
(0.993)  (1.445)  (0.841)  (1.111) 
-0.157  3.433  3.268 
(1.025)  (0.923)  (0.497) 
-3.061  -6.494  -6.328 
(1.131)  (1.242)  (0.942) 
S.E.  2.971  3.066  2.515  1.846  1.787 
R2  0.395  0.396  0.594  0.796  0.795 
DW  1.84  1.83  1.88  2.76  2.70 
35 Table  3. 
Staple  Ecencaic  Influences  Regrasatena 
A. House of  Representatives,  g,  annual 
Prosperity  Xramar-  81oom-  Squared  Deviation 
Fair  Price  Fixed  Eat. 
Constant  45.451'  46.184'  46.599'  46.590'  46.828' 
(0.854)  (0.666)  (0.692)  (0.573)  (0.806) 




-g4-gI  -0.158 
(0.149) 
4-  1.266 
-(1-5 )g I 
(0.970) 
-  0)21  0.101  0.094 
(0.044)  (0.072) 
o  2.959  3.773 
fixed  (1.876) 
SR.  2.575  2.698  2.586  2.398  2.233 
0.137  0.053  0.184  O.252  O.27O 
DW  1.46  2.05  1.51  1.45 
22n1.  -80.006 
B. Senate, g, annual 
Prosperity  raaer-  Bloat-  Squared  Deviation 
Fair  Price  Fixed  Lit. 
Constant  45.309'  46.184  48.171'  46.590'  48.539' 
(0.958)  (0.666)  (0.922)  (0.573)  (0.685) 
g  0.738 
(0.223) 
-gZ  -0.061 
(0.219) 
+ 
-$ gI  -0.083 
(0.199) 
+  2.577 
-(l-g  )gI  (1.253) 
• )I  0.128'  0.062 
(0.062)  (0.081) 
a  2.959  7.000 
fixed  (4.330) 
SE.  2.943  3.811  3.448  3.389  2.901 
O.4O6  0.005  0.236  0.213  O.35O 
OW  2.21  2.68  2.33  2.53 
2lnL  .89.418 
• Coefficient  significantly  differ  fret 0  at  0.05  level or batter 
(ens-tailed). 
F-test  for regression  significant  at  0.05 level or  b.ttsr. 
36 Table  4. 
Economic Influences,  Lagged  Regressions 
A. House,  g annual 
Prosperity  Kramer-  Bloom-  Squared Deviation 
Fair  Price  Fixed  Eat. 
Constant  45.45?  46.300*  47.041*  46.413*  46.828* 
(1.219)  (0.666)  (0.734)  (0.535)  (0.806) 
g variables  0.319  -0.048  0.045  0.084*  0.050 
(0.194)  (0.191)  (0.214)  (0.041)  (0.094) 
1.266 
(0.970) 
g  variables  0.272  -0.161  -0.171  0.075*  0.108 
- 
(0.243)  (0.179)  (0.196)  (0.038)  (0.181) 
3.581 
(2.333)  2.959  4.671* 
fixed  (2.313) 
S.E.  2.555  2.715  2.538  2.208  1.816 
R  0.204  0.101  0.319  0.405  0.5l7 
DW  1.60  1.86  1.82  1.90 
2lnL  -72.563 
B. Senate.  g annual 
Prosperity  Kramer-  Bloom-  Squared  Deviation 
Fair  Price  Fixed  Est. 
Constant  43.641  47.767  48.810  47.479  47.929 
(1.323)  (0.941)  (0.895)  (0.722)  (0.655) 
g variables  0.751*  0.238  0.365  0.100*  0.104 
(0.211)  (0.242)  (0.260)  (0.055)  (0.088) 
2.  109* 
(1.182) 
variables  0.454  -0.488  -0.501  0.123*  0.129 
(0.264)  (0.227)  (0.239)  (0.051)  (0.218) 
4.  736* 
(2.843) 
a  2.959  3•934* 
fixed  (1.463) 
S.E.  t779  3.440  3.448  2.978  2.583 
1(2  0.504  O.24O'  0.468  O./+3O  0.485? 
DW  2.25  2.30  2.41  2.66 
21.nL  -85.254 
* Coefficient significantly  differ  from  0 at 0.05 level  or better 
(one-tailed). 
t F-test or likelihood  ratio test for including  lagged  terms  in 
regression  significant  at 0.05  level  or  better. 
37 Table  5. 
Economic  Influences  Regressions:  GNP,  Incumbency,  and Trend 
A. House 
Squared  Deviation 
Lags  Mo Lags  Lags 
Kramer-  Fair 
No Lags 












0.  156 
(0.226) 






















2.959  2.959 





















1.51  1.47  1.69  1.91 
B. Senate 
Kramer-Fair  Squared 
No Lags  Lags  No  Lags 
50.557*  50.484*  47.562* 
(1.975)  (2.035)  (1.830) 
0.683*  0.663*  0.096 
(0.315)  (0.326)  (0.102) 
-0.161 
(0.322) 
3.503*  2.849  0.629 
(1.204)  (1.262)  (1.263) 
-0.189  -0.193  0.022 




























* Coefficient significantly  differ  from  0 at 0.05 level  or better 
(one-tailed). 
* Coefficient  significantly  differ  from  0 at 0.05 level  or better 
(two-tailed). 
t F-test  or likelihood  ratio  test for regression  significant  at 0.05 level  or 
better. 
38 Squared  Deviation 
Lags  No Lags  Lags 
48.427  47.866*  47.083* 
(1.437)  (1.260)  (1.301) 
0.126  0.016  0.022 
(0.194)  (0.084)  (0.080.) 
-0.100  0.066 
(0.179)  (D.D42) 
1.634  1.456  1.201 
(1.262)  (1.451)  (1.392) 
-0.190  -0.145  -0.076 
(0.125)  (0.124)  (0.126) 
2.959  2.959 
fixed  fixed 
2.460  2.412  2.297 
0.360  0.338  0.442 
1.22  1.34  1.71 
Fair  Squared  Deviation 
Lags  No Lags  Laga 
49.620*  48.311*  46.768* 
(1.683)  (1.636)  (1.470) 
0.422*  -0.062  -0.051 
(0.227)  (0.109)  (0.090) 
-0.321  0.130 
(0.209)  (0.048) 
3.045*  4.074*  3.570* 
(1.262)  (1.885)  (1.573) 
-0.151  -0.076  0.060 
(0.147)  (0.161)  (0.142) 
2.959  2.959 
fixed  fixed 
3.133  2.596 
0.412  0.625 
1.76  1.91 
0 at 0.05 level  or better 
0 at 0.05 level  or better 
Table  6. 
Economic  Influences  Regressions:  GNP,  Midterm,  and Trend 






































SE.  3.018  2.881 
0.454  0.538 
DW  1.66  1.44 
* Coefficient significantly  differ  from 
(one-tailed). 
* Coefficient significantly  differ  from 
(two-tailed). 
t F-test or likelihood  ratio  test for regression  significant  at 0.05  level or 
better. 
39 Appendix  A 
Proof  of Proposition  2. 
*  —  —D  The  inequalities  x  < x  < x < x  can be easily established  by using 
*  A  —  (9)  ,  (16)  ,  (21)  and (24)  .  The  inequalities  x  <  x <  x can be established  as 
follows.  If q — k,  (27) can be rewritten  as an equality  as follows: 
2  2  2  21  —D  —R 
flu—  -x 




We  want to show first  that 
(A-2) 
Using (A-i),  (A-2) implies  after  rearrangement: 
2i[° 
-  + 
2fl[ 
-  >  - 
x*][x* 
+  +  -  + 
_aJ  (A-3) 
- _J[2 
- 
[—o+—aJ]  +fl[ 
- 
*J2 
>  0  (A-4) 
The  second term in (A-4)  is positive; the first is also  positive, if: 
—D  —a  —  x  +x  x  > 
2  (A-5) 
If q — k,  (16) implies  the following  inequalities: 
D—R 
(A-6) 
Condition  (9)  implies  0  <  C  1,  which  implies  >  -ic. 
Consequently,  (A-6)  implies  (A-5). Thus (A-6) holds.  By repeating the  same 
procedure  one obtains  that  > x* if and only  if 
- J(xF 
-  (°+)J 
- $(-x) <0  (A-7) 
40 Using (16) and (A-6) one can easily  show  that (A-7) holds.  Q.E.D. 
Consider  now the case  of q  k.  The inequalities  corresponding  to (A-4) 
and (A-7) are as follows: 
-  R)[2 
- 
[_D +]] 
+  -  >  (q2-k2)Var(a)  (A-8) 
D  —R  *  —D  R  —  * 
2  2  2 
- 
x][2x  x 
+  -  -  x 
) 
<  (q -k)Var(a)  (A9) 
(A-8)  and (A-9)  show  what is claimed  in the text,  precisely  that Proposition 
2 holds also for q 0 k  as long as q and  Ic  are not too different  or var(a) is 









House  Senate 















Growth  Rate 
Real  Income 
per Capita 
I 
7.062  -1.995 
1952  49.844  53.712  3.902  10.345  -0.337  2.580  2.465 
1954  47.272  43.665  -1.329  4.004  -0.145  -1.249  3.571 
1956  48.797  48.905  2.059  5.555  -0.688  3.919  5.590 
1958  43,603  44.027  -0.766  1.670  4.199  -1.393  0.376 
1960  45.029  44.534  2.219  5.836  -1.917  1.600  3.729 
1962  47.363  49.235  5.310  2.608  2.477  3.551  1.249 
1964  42.498  43.247  5.336  4.108  2.380  4.266  2.332 
1966  48.673  51.617  5,787  5,792  1.434  4.470  5.170 
1968  49.078  49.189  4.152  2.852  4.002  4,242  3.224 
1970  45.775  44.989  -0.292  2.436  0,948  0.420  2.695 
1972  47.335  53.679  4.980  2.839  5.054  5.138  1.808 
1974  41.323  42.013  -0.536  5.195  -2.951  -1,973  4.676 
1976  42.754  44.635  4.887  -1.259  0.781  3,530  -1.553 
1978  45.678  48.590  5.290  4.669  7.072  3,648  2.979 
1980  48.714  47.394  -0.160  2.476  -5.694  -3.328  -0.254 
1982  43.782  44.039  -2.546  1.931  -2.009  -1.226  0,098 
1984  47.220  50.862  6.429  3.572  2.693  4.110  1.992 
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